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Kingdom; and Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
Focusing on the strategically important Caspian region, this article demonstrates
how commercial energy diplomacy – political support for foreign-investing
businesses – is increasingly conducted at the European Union (EU) level. It
explains why member states have delegated this role, despite a general
hesitancy to co-operate in foreign energy policy and perceptions of a strong
division between diplomacy-based and (EU-favoured) governance-based
approaches to external energy policy. To explain this new role (and its limits),
this article employs a functional–rationalist framework focusing on the
structural demands of a more challenging international energy environment
and EU-level supply factors (economies of scale, increased leverage and more
neutral/less politicized position of the EU) that help respond to it. Overall, the
article examines an important area of increasing EU foreign energy co-
operation and demonstrates how energy governance and diplomacy are not
necessarily competing approaches, but rather different tools for achieving a
more secure investment climate for European companies.
KEY WORDS Caspian region; commercial diplomacy; energy diplomacy; energy governance; European
Union; Market Power Europe
Introduction
Given their tax contributions and the number of people they employ, the con-
ditions facing major foreign-operating ﬁrms are a key concern for govern-
ments. In the ﬁeld of energy, this concern is heightened owing to the key
energy supply role that energy companies play (Egenhofer and Legge 2001:
1; European Commission [EC], 2010: 32). States have historically engaged in
‘commercial diplomacy’ as a means to support foreign-investing energy
businesses – helping them win deals and protect their business interests
once they have invested (Kostecki and Naray 2007). In the European Union
(EU), via the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the Commission has compe-
tence over international economic negotiations and, since the Lisbon Treaty,
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responsibility for foreign investment agreements (Parello-Plesner and Ortiz de
Solóranzo 2013). However, while the EU’s role in economic diplomacy (the
negotiation of economic/trade agreements) is well deﬁned within the CCP,
its broader role in foreign direct investment (FDI), including business-support-
ing commercial diplomacy, is not (ibid.: 5).
Given the EU record in energy policy, one might expect a limited role for EU
commercial energy diplomacy. Amongst observers of its energy policy, the EU
is often considered to be rather ineffective when it comes to diplomacy.
Energy policy is an area of mixed competence in the EU and ‘energy diplo-
macy’ – traditionally a member state prerogative – is often contrasted with
a more market-focused governance approach thought to be characteristic
of the EU’s (especially Commission’s) preferred methods for advancing
energy objectives (Goldthau and Sitter 2015; Youngs 2009). The EU has been
described as a ‘liberal actor’ or ‘regulatory state’ in energy policy with the
primary task (and tool) of EU external energy policy seen as the promotion of
governance frameworks derived, where possible, from the EU’s energy acquis
(Goldthau and Sitter 2014, 2015). Energy diplomacy, conversely, is commonly
associated with the self-interested foreign policies of states and the politiciza-
tion of energy (Goldthau 2010: 28; see Herranz-Surrallés 2015: 914–8). Some
contend that EU-level efforts to engage in diplomacy or ‘speak with one
voice’ are unlikely to be effective because such actions run counter to the econ-
omic nature of the EU project and/or are hindered by member state tensions
(Finon 2011: 49; Kovaĉovská 2007; Schmidt-Felzmann 2011).
By contrast, this article demonstrates how the EU now plays a signiﬁcant role
in the area of commercial energy diplomacy. Drawing on a case study of the
Caspian region, and Kazakhstan in particular, it shows how the EU has come
to both co-ordinate common EU-level commercial diplomatic action and rep-
resent EU actors in key commercial diplomatic fora. Such observations, of
course, beg a question: why, given member states’ hesitancy to upload
foreign energy policy roles to the EU (especially in strategic areas) and the per-
ceived division between energy governance and diplomacy, have member
states delegated this speciﬁc role in commercial diplomacy to the EU?
To answer this question, this article adopts a rationalist framework focusing
on the demands created by an increasingly challenging international system,
and EU-level supply of political support functions designed to protect compa-
nies in the face of these challenges. It demonstrates how both EU member
states and ﬁrms have found foreign energy markets increasingly challenging
after 2004/5, to the point where member states have struggled to provide
effective protection for businesses. In response, EU-level action has offered
a number of beneﬁts that help meet these new challenges. First, the EU
offers an economy of scale promising increased efﬁciencies (for often-
stretched member states) and more leverage in foreign energy markets for
EU members and commercial players alike. Second, because the EU does
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not represent any speciﬁc energy company, it cuts a more ‘neutral’ (less poli-
ticized) ﬁgure in energy relations, helping to diffuse tensions with producer
states in politicized markets.
This article makes three important contributions to the literatures on com-
mercial, energy and foreign policy. First, the article challenges perceptions of
the EU as unable to co-ordinate diplomatically in energy, by showing how EU
commercial diplomacy (which has received less academic attention than
other aspects of energy policy) represents an example of effective ongoing
external energy co-operation between EU actors. Second, the article presents
a more nuanced view of the nature of EU external energy policy by detailing
the interaction between EU governance and diplomacy in practice. Rather
than contrasting approaches, governance externalization and diplomatic
practices can be different means of achieving the same objective: the estab-
lishment of a secure investment environment for European energy compa-
nies. Here, as will be shown, diplomacy does not function in contrast to
governance frameworks, but rather governance is a pre-condition of EU com-
mercial diplomatic action. This analysis thus broadly supports the ‘market-
power Europe’ (MPE) view of EU foreign policy as outlined by Damro
(2012). However, rather than focus on governance dimensions of the
EU’s ‘externalization of its economic and social market-related policies and
regulatory measures’ (ibid.: 696), this article assesses the EU’s market-supporting
role by examining the links between the EU’s strategic economic diplomacy
and its more ad-hoc commercial (business-supporting) diplomacy. Finally,
more broadly, this article contributes new understandings of the role of the
core tools of investment protection and political risk-mitigation in the EU’s
broader international economic arsenal – important given the growth of FDI
in the global economy (Parello-Plesner and Ortiz de Solóranzo 2013: 1).
The article comprises ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst describes what is meant by
‘diplomacy’, ‘commercial diplomacy’ and ‘economic diplomacy’, and details
their interaction. The second discusses the functional–rationalist theoretical
framework and data-collection methods. The third examines EU economic
diplomacy and governance promotion in the Caspian region. The fourth con-
siders the structural demand and EU-level supply factors that have driven the
growing EU commercial diplomacy role over the last decade. The ﬁnal section
highlights EU and member state limits on this type of activity, explaining why
the EU will likely remain an important supplement to, rather than a replace-
ment for, member state commercial diplomacy.
Diplomacy, commercial (energy) diplomacy and economic
diplomacy
Diplomacy is ‘a means to a [foreign policy] end’ based on representation,
negotiation and communication (Carta 2012: 13). It is essentially an instrument
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of foreign policy (alongside others such as governance, aid spending, espio-
nage, etc.) (Hocking 2004: 92). Kostecki and Naray (2007: 1) describe commer-
cial diplomacy as ‘a government activity that aims at the development of
socially beneﬁcial business ventures’. From this perspective it is a subtype
of broader diplomacy, a means of supporting foreign-operating businesses
through representation, communication and negotiation.
Commercial diplomacy can be subdivided into ‘investment promotion’ and
‘investment protection’. Investment promotion entails the provision of
business intelligence about market opportunities, ‘partnering’ investors with
host country companies and assisting with the negotiation of contracts,
especially in sensitive or security-related areas (Naray 2008: 5). The post-
investment ‘protective’ dimensions of commercial diplomacy involve primar-
ily what is referred to as ‘conﬂict-handling’ or ‘problem solving’ diplomacy
(ibid.). This concerns assisting companies with the political risks that can
emerge in foreign markets, including, inter alia, the protection of property
rights, engagement on tax and regulatory issues and ‘assistance to national
companies which have suffered losses and wish to obtain compensation as
well as various forms of support provided as diplomatic protection’ (Kostecki
and Naray 2007: 10).
Important for the discussion below is the distinction between commercial
diplomacy and broader ‘economic/trade diplomacy’. In the EU context, the
establishment of external governance frameworks that deﬁne trade and
investment terms (such as partnership and co-operation agreements
[PCAs]) are the outcome (foreign policy end) of economic diplomacy (the
means). Commercial diplomacy is, by contrast, concerned with ‘business-
support activities’ for speciﬁc companies or industrial sectors (ibid.: 2).
However, while different, economic diplomacy and commercial diplomacy
are intrinsically interconnected. Indeed, commercial diplomacy aims to take
advantage of opportunities established by broader trade diplomacy (Potter
2004: 55). As will be shown below, EU commercial diplomacy is sometimes
only possible in the wake of (and certainly enhanced by) broader econ-
omic/trade diplomacy that establishes the basis and rules governing foreign
investment in the ﬁrst place.
Explaining the EU role in commercial energy diplomacy:
theoretical framework and data collection
This article adopts a functionalist–rationalist framework to understand EU
commercial diplomatic activity. Such approaches have a long pedigree in
studies of EU foreign policy where member states have signiﬁcant discretion
over decisions. Rationalist approaches see EU co-operation as a functional
effort to deal with a mismatch between ‘territorial scale’ of policy problems
and the limits of ‘political authority’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009: 3; Wagner
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2003). Commercial diplomacy is in essence an example of ‘structural’ or
‘milieu-shaping’ foreign policy aimed at managing the challenges presented
by (different) political/regulatory environments in countries surrounding the
EU (Hyde-Price 2008: Keukeleire 2003; Smith 2004). Murray (1971) has
described the mismatch between the territorial scale of foreign investment
patterns and political authority as the problem of ‘territorial non-coincidence’.
This territorial non-coincidence, reﬂected in international differences in regu-
lation, property rights and governance practices requires governments to
promote ‘state economic functions’ (such as the safeguarding of property
rights or regulatory stability) abroad to support foreign-operating companies
(ibid.: 85). Because the energy industry is often politicized (Wilson 1987), com-
panies tend to rely heavily on the provision of state economic functions. As
Smith (2004: 79) describes (and as shown below), the provision of ‘state econ-
omic functions’ and diplomatic support for them is increasingly provided at
the EU level. The EU’s commercial diplomacy can be thus seen as a functional
means of dealing with energy policy challenges that arise in areas outside of
the EU’s territorial jurisdiction where host states are unlikely to provide these
functions themselves.
A rationalist view of EU foreign policy action suggests that EU member
states (those actors with the capacity to cede foreign policy to the EU level)
will do so when the functional beneﬁts of (commercial diplomatic) co-oper-
ation outweigh the beneﬁts of maintaining competences at a national level
(Hill 1998: 36). One anticipates a number of factors when accounting for
EU-level policy through a functionalist–rationalist framework. First, given
that the previous status quo was provision of commercial diplomacy by
member states, one would expect to see changes in the structural environ-
ment creating functional demands for a new (collective) response. It is unlikely
that member states or energy companies would seek EU-level policy solutions
if member state solutions were sufﬁcient. Second, in response to such
changes, one would expect to observe actors demonstrating instrumental
rationality and utility-maximization logics (Lewis 2003: 102). Instrumental
rationality suggests that actors are motivated by a ‘logic of anticipated conse-
quences and prior preferences’ (March and Olsen 1998: 949). That is to say
that member states’ decisions are inﬂuenced both by their existing prefer-
ences and the extent to which future co-operation is likely to be able to
meet them. Utility maximization, likewise, would suggest that states are con-
cerned overall with weighing up trade-offs (in this case the pros/cons of EU
co-operation and delegation) (Lewis 2003: 102). Here, one would also
expect to see member states placing restrictions on commercial diplomatic
activities that went beyond that necessary to deal with the challenges
faced. Third, for EU-level co-operation to be chosen as the means of respond-
ing to functional demands, EU-level action must supply beneﬁts that cannot
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be realized at the member state-level alone. As discussed below, all of these
factors are evident in the case here.
The analysis below is structured around the demand and supply factors
that explain increased EU-level commercial diplomacy co-operation. In par-
ticular, the sections below will highlight the functional demands created by
increasingly challenging territorial non-coincidence in the Caspian (that
puts pressure on companies and the member states alike) and the beneﬁts
of providing state-economic function-supporting diplomacy at the EU
level.
Data collection
This research employs several different data sources. The main source was
interviews with ofﬁcials from the European External Action Service (EEAS),
the European Commission (Directorates-General [DGs] Trade/Energy), the
energy industry and EU member states. Totalling over 40 interviews, these
were conducted as part of a broader project between 2011 and 2015 in Brus-
sels, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Given the limited public information and politi-
cal sensitivities of this issue area, interviews were an essential means of data
collection.1 All interviewees were/had been involved in the Caspian region,
permitting access to ﬁrst-hand accounts and triangulation between perspec-
tives. The second primary data source was contributions to the EU’s public
consultations on energy in 2006 and 2011. A number of factors suggest
that these are reliable accounts for the purposes here. First, documents fre-
quently both contradict and support EU ofﬁcial positions suggesting that
they are not mere platitudes. Second, false responses could be used against
actors in the future. Third, similar objections/positions are often raised inde-
pendently by similar actors. Finally, stated positions also triangulate with
data collected from interviews.
The data analysis approach used in this paper is qualitative content analysis
(QCA). QCA refers to techniques used to analyse qualitative data including
purely qualitative methods that examine the informational content of
data for detail and meaning (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1277). In particular,
this work involved directed QCA that is used to test hypothesis and to ‘validate
or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory’ (ibid.: 1281). The use
of this approach is more restricted with regard to the interview data than
document-derived data, as interviewees generally preferred not to be
quoted verbatim. Nevertheless, the interview data are valuable in this
case as they present detailed information on the subject matter, much of
which is not available publically. Furthermore, the data can still be analysed
in much the same way as the textual data, i.e., via coding, the looking
for patterns and, ultimately, as a source for the testing of theoretical
assumptions.
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EU economic diplomacy and governance promotion in the
Caspian: 1990s to mid-2000s
The EU has had an active economic/trade diplomacy policy in the Caspian
region since the early 1990s. Following the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), EU regional reconstruction packages, such as Technical
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) and the
associated Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) programme
sought to provide economic aid and know-how to the newly independent
states (NIS) with the objective of bolstering energy infrastructures and increas-
ing regional energy integration between the EU and the countries of Eurasia
(Hadﬁeld 2008: 325). Likewise, in the early 1990s the European Commission
was instrumental in pushing forward early (but important) governance frame-
works. The European Energy Charter Process started in 1991 (subsequently
Energy Charter Treaty [1994]) sought to balance NIS investment needs, with
investor protection and trade provisions for foreign companies derived
from EU and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (now
Wolrd Trade Organization [WTO]) rules. Similarly, the mid-1990s saw the adop-
tion of EU PCAs (covering trade and energy) with states in the region (Kazakh-
stan in 1995 and Azerbaijan 1996). However, with Caspian states keen to
attract FDI and build their global reputations, they offered relatively benign
investment conditions, and companies and member states (sometimes with
support of the United States [Goel 2004]), were largely able to manage
issues that arose from doing business in these markets.2 Between the 1990s
and the early 2000s, the Caspian Sea region did not feature especially promi-
nently on the EU-level foreign policy agenda (Lussac 2010: 609).
Mid-2000s: up-scaling EU economic diplomacy and governance
promotion
It wasn’t until the mid-2000s that the EU increased considerably its energy
engagement in the Caspian region. This was due, in no small part, to changing
perceptions of the EU’s energy dependence on Russia following the 2006
Ukrainian gas crisis.3 This, and subsequent gas crises (Belarus 2007 and
Ukraine again in 2009), damaged European perceptions of Russia as a reliable
energy supplier, adding to the tense atmosphere of heightened global
demand and rapidly increasing energy prices (Lussac 2010: 619; Schmidt-Felz-
mann 2011: 575). Given their resources, proximity to the EU and potential as
sources of diversiﬁcation, Caspian states loomed into focus for EU policy-
makers as a strategic concern (Youngs 2009: 101).
In 2004, the EU included the countries of the South Caucasus and Central
Asia in the ‘Baku Initiative’, a Black Sea–Caspian Sea energy framework
designed to facilitate energy co-operation with the EU. This was up-scaled
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in 2006 with the signing of the ‘Astana Road Map’ that included, inter alia, a
more detailed focus on energy investment. The EU signed energy ‘memor-
anda of understanding’ (MOUs) with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2006
and another in 2008 with Turkmenistan. In 2007, the EU launched its
Central Asia Strategy, with ‘energy and transport’, ‘economic development,
trade and investment’ and ‘the rule of law’ as three of the seven core strategic
areas of co-operation. In the Caucasus, Azerbaijan was included in both the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 and the Eastern Partnership
(EaP) in 2009 – both seeking to facilitate energy co-operation (see Youngs
2009).
Importantly, governance frameworks offered EU ofﬁcials more opportu-
nities to supplement governance promotion with (commercial) diplomacy.
Under the auspices of the energy MOUs, for example, the EU holds annual
meetings with representatives from Caspian states to discuss energy-related
issues of common interest – including energy business matters such as invest-
ment conditions and export rules4. The EU also discusses energy matters at
diplomatic engagements such as annual bilateral Co-operation Committees
and (higher-level) Co-operation Councils, as well as (in the Central Asia
case) EU–Central Asia Ministerial Meetings.5 These meetings cover a multitude
of co-operation issues covered within the PCAs and the Central Asia Strategy,
including energy. In both cases, the most politically sensitive discussions (con-
cerning energy relations with Russia, for example) are discussed at (off-the-
record) lunches, with only senior ofﬁcials in attendance.6
Furthermore, economic/energy governance frameworks play another
essential role in underpinning EU commercial diplomacy. Once agreement
had been reached on governance frameworks (a product of economic diplo-
macy), one can then use these agreements as a basis for commercial diplo-
matic action.7 Rather than two different approaches, ofﬁcials suggest that
the norms/rules contained in the EU’s legal and governance arrangements
with a producer state that provide the basis for the EU to act.8 The more
detailed and extensive the EU’s economic governance agreements, the
more scope they give EU actors for commercial diplomacy.9
From governance frameworks to in-country commercial
diplomacy: demand and supply factors in the shift to EU-level
commercial diplomacy in Kazakhstan
While stepped-up economic diplomacy and governance promotion in the
Caspian provided a basis for commercial diplomacy, ‘in-country’ factors
played a big role in the upscaling of commercial diplomacy in practice. By
2006 some European companies were also calling for an enhanced EU com-
mercial diplomatic role in the Caspian. Their interests, however, lay less in
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supply diversiﬁcation than the increasing investment challenges they faced
after the mid-2000s.
New functional demands: an increasingly challenging structural
environment
In line with the Wilson’s (1987) ‘petro-political cycle’ that sees oil markets
becoming politicized during times of high oil prices, the investment climate
became more challenging in oil-producing countries across the globe
during the period of high international oil prices after the mid-2000s
(roughly 2004–2014). Outside of Russia, the situation in Kazakhstan was the
most difﬁcult in the Former Soviet Union (Domjan and Stone 2010). This is
owing to a number of incidents where the Kazakh government is alleged to
have used environmental and project development issues to put pressure
on foreign investors and to forcibly wrest a greater share of key energy pro-
jects (Bremmer and Johnston 2009: 151). In addition to this, during this
period Kazakhstan boosted the role of the state in the natural resources
sector by (inter alia) increasing regulation on foreign companies, particularly
that concerning local content requirements and changing laws to give the
state oil company KazMunaiGas a bigger role in energy projects (Kennedy
and Nurmakov 2010). The net effect was a more challenging and less predict-
able environment for foreign investors by the mid-2000s than had been the
case over the previous decade.
EU public consultations on energy policy launched in 2006 highlighted the
desires of European companies already active in the Caspian region for
greater EU-level engagement (BG Group 2006: 7–8; Statoil 2006: 9).10 By
2010/11, a broader range of companies and business associations were
calling for an increased EU role in diplomatic support for businesses abroad,
including in the Caspian. The Italian oil company Eni (2011: 4), which experi-
enced a series of major investment dispute with the Kazakh government,
argued that the ‘primary aim of any EU energy external action should be
that of applying all political tools at the EU level to guarantee international
investment protection’. The European natural gas industry association –
Eurogas (2011: 3) – noted that EU political dialogue (i.e., diplomacy) with sup-
pliers ‘can only be beneﬁcial for the business climate’. Shell (also active in
Kazakhstan) called for EU political support in Central Asia, arguing that a
‘signiﬁcant up-scaling of Commission and member state government ﬁnancial
and political resources invested in Central Asia is needed’ (Royal Dutch
Shell 2011: 4). Shell also noted a role for the EU in intergovernmental
agreements and called for help with sovereign risk and political support in
general (ibid.: 6).
Likewise, and perhaps more surprisingly, in both the 2006 and 2011 consul-
tations member states echoed these calls. Indeed, in 2006 the United
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Kingdom (UK) government (2006a: 25) suggested that ‘the UK would also
support continued working between the Commission and businesses active
in Russia, Caspian and Central Asia to get a better understanding of the pro-
blems of doing business there’ (UK Government 2006b: 4). UK ofﬁcials spoken
to in 2012 praised EU co-ordination on energy, welcoming the fact there was
by then a dedicated EU energy ofﬁcer covering the Central Asia region from
Astana.11 In 2011, the French government (French Permanent Representation
2011: 2) noted that:
an important objective of partnerships between the EU and producing countries
(notably gas producers) must be support for European energy companies
present in these countries, who are, and who will remain, the principal agents
of European energy supply.
Likewise, the Czech government highlighted the EU role in ‘protecting Euro-
pean investments’ (Government of the Czech Republic 2011: 1–2).
Meeting functional demand: ‘problem solving’ co-ordination and
commercial diplomatic representation
In Kazakhstan, demands for an upscaling of EU investment protection have
been matched by increased commercial diplomacy. In particular, EU activity
has been up-scaled in terms of both intra-European co-ordination and rep-
resentation on commercial diplomatic matters.
Co-ordination
In Astana, the EU delegation contributes a number of forums for member
states, companies and external partners to co-ordinate on commercial
energy matters. One member state ofﬁcial noted that the EU delegation in
Astana is very good at co-ordinating member state responses to problems
that arise and suggested that this leads to a stronger overall position for
those member states involved.12 Regular working group meetings held at
the EU delegation itself bring together energy and trade ofﬁcials from
member states and the delegation, and provide the opportunity to also
invite Kazakh ofﬁcials to explain policy changes.13 These meetings are a
forum for discussing developments and formulating co-ordination actions
when necessary. Likewise, informal ‘energy lunches’ are organized by some
of the prominent member states, the EU delegation and the US Embassy
every six weeks to discuss energy matters.14 Co-ordination also is necessary
with European ﬁrms active in Kazakhstan. Companies have access to EU ofﬁ-
cials in Astana and are in regular contact with member state and EU ofﬁcials in
Brussels. In Astana the EU delegation, many EUmember state embassies and a
number of European energy companies are all located in the same building.
Companies, one EU ofﬁcial noted, tend to rely on personal relations when they
decide who to approach in the EU and member states.15 They do, however,
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regularly approach the EU directly rather than going indirectly via member
states.16 Ofﬁcials recognize that the nature of the industry structure in Kazakh-
stan and the joint-challenges that companies face means that it is often pre-
ferable for EU member states and companies to co-ordinate together in
response to issues, rather than to act separately.17 Concerns for one
company often reﬂect wider problems for the industry as a whole, so EU ofﬁ-
cials or representatives are able to co-ordinate and raise it as a broader issue.18
Representation
EU involvement in commercial diplomacy goes beyond co-ordination,
however. Ofﬁcials from the EU delegation often represent European actors
at commercial diplomatic fora such as the Kazakhstan Foreign Investors’
Council (FIC) chaired by the Kazakh president or prime minister. This is the
highest-level regular meeting of this type in Kazakhstan, with the EU regularly
represented by the head of delegation and head of trade section.19 Numerous
events or policy changes that have a negative impact for European companies
can trigger such representations. One example was changes to ‘local content
rules’ in 2011 that placed restrictions on hiring foreign workers and made it
difﬁcult for European companies to recruit employees with the requisite
skills. EU ofﬁcials, in conjunction with member states and companies, orga-
nized a successful campaign, employed at technical and political levels
(such as EU PCA meetings and the local Kazakh FIC in Astana), to have rules
relaxed for major energy investors in Kazakhstan who were most affected.20
More recently, in 2015, the EU delegation co-ordinated with the US and Cana-
dian Embassies to write a ‘non-paper’ on three ongoing issues facing energy
companies in the region (gas ﬂaring ﬁnes, visa problems for energy company
ofﬁcials and restrictions on engineering licenses).21 The EU played an integral
lobbying role: co-ordinating the positions of member states, co-writing the
paper in conjunction with the US and Canada and then actually representing
the EU at the presentation of the paper at the FIC.22
In the event of a dispute with the Kazakh government, EU ofﬁcials describe
a number of commercial diplomacy options. First, EU ofﬁcials can use low-
level technical meetings with Kazakh ofﬁcials to raise an issue and explore
options for a speedy resolution. Second, the delegation can use contacts in
the Kazakh government to send an ofﬁcial letter or have a meeting to set
out their point. Examples include a joint letter sent by the EU on behalf of a
number of member state ambassadors to the Kazakh prime minister on the
imposition of new (more restrictive) licences for engineering companies (a
recurring issue).23 Third, the EU can also send an ofﬁcial demarche to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs which will often be followed up by a meeting with
Kazakh ofﬁcials. Such meetings will sometimes be undertaken by the EU del-
egation (with member states and companies kept informed by verbal and
written brieﬁngs),24 and at other times ofﬁcials from the delegation may go
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to meet Kazakh counterparts with a number of member state ofﬁcials or
ambassadors present (and sometimes those from non-EU states such as the
US).25 On major problems, ofﬁcials will raise issues at multiple venues and
levels, signalling the importance of a speciﬁc dispute.26 Tactics chosen
reﬂect both the seriousness of a case and what is considered to be the
most effective means of dealing with it.
Supply-side explanations: the functional ‘value-added’ of an
increased EU role in commercial diplomacy
That member states and energy companies faced an increasingly difﬁcult
environment does not, in and of itself, explain why member states delegated
this new commercial diplomacy role to the EU. To complete the explanation, it
is necessary to examine the functional beneﬁts (for both member states and
energy companies) that EU-level action provides.
EU ‘value-added’ 1: economy of scale and increased leverage
Member states recognize that EU-level action offers greater efﬁciency and
leverage than individual member state action. While small member states
prioritize the most important countries in their respective external environ-
ment, larger states (such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK) try to cover
all geographical regions, and consequently get stretched in places like
Central Asia where they have fewer resources and less representation.27 As
EU ofﬁcials note, when member states have common perspectives on a
speciﬁc issue, the EU’s co-ordination and representation capacity provides
an important source of efﬁciency and EU ‘added-value’.28
However, increased inﬂuence is perhaps a more important beneﬁt of EU-
level action. Directly linking the more challenging structural environment
and increased EU-level action, one German government ofﬁcial acknowl-
edged that as international energy relations have become more challenging
(given the increased assertiveness of producers), the EU was consequently
evolving to meet this reality.29 A UK government ofﬁcial noted the extra inﬂu-
ence in the Caspian region that comes from working in collaboration with
other EU states (and sometimes non-EU states, Switzerland or Norway).30
They stressed that while UK lobbying gets noticed, political pressure is
more effective when member states are speaking for all European companies
in conjunction with delegations.31 The EU’s weight as a trading bloc is thought
to be a particularly important factor that backs up this inﬂuence when inter-
acting with Caspian governments.32 Operating at the EU level, larger member
states gain more inﬂuence than they would alone, and smaller member states
get their voices heard when they otherwise might not be.
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Companies also value the increased leverage that EU action presents. In a
more challenging environment, one ofﬁcial from a prominent energy
company described how the EU might be able to replace the US as a key
market-supporting player if it developed in the ‘right way’ (i.e., developed a
strong capacity for providing political support and the projection of inﬂu-
ence).33 They suggested that US backing has waned and that the EU
needed to ﬁll the void.34 Similarly, RWE note that creating a stable political/
regulatory environment outside of the EU may be an impossible task for
both industry and individual member states, and only possible at the EU-
level (RWE 2011: 3).
EU value-added 2: an additional source of political support
Companies, however, also value the EU as an additional source of support
when member states are unwilling or unable to intervene on their behalf.
Indeed, engagement with the EU is an important part of their risk mitigation
strategies,35 as being dependent on a single source of support (i.e., just their
home member state) carries risks (Henisz and Zelner 2011: 214). Governments
may value issues differently to companies and may sacriﬁce company objec-
tives for broader political issues. While not from the Caspian region, Argenti-
na’s nationalization of Spanish company Repsol provides an example.
Following the expropriation in 2012, the EU started WTO proceedings
against Argentina, partly as a response to the nationalization. The Spanish
government had reportedly been warned by its trade lawyers of risks to
other Spanish companies in Argentina had it acted unilaterally, and thus it
opted to raise this issue via the EU (Minder 2012). This highlights how other
considerations (the interests of other Spanish companies) might have
limited Spain’s ability to respond to the Repsol crisis – leaving the EU as a valu-
able alternative option for the company (ibid.).
EU value-added 3: a more ‘neutral’ source of business support in
politicized markets
The EU is also thought by EU ofﬁcials, member states and companies to be a
more ‘neutral’ actor than other international players (and most member
states) in international affairs. One EU ofﬁcial contended that Central Asian
states trust the EU more than the US, Russia or China and that the lack of
defence/military dimension to EU external interaction in the Caspian region
reduces fears of the EU relative to others.36 Importantly, the EU does not rep-
resent a single/small number of national energy companies and is conse-
quently seen to be less subjective with regard to energy matters (it does
represent the ‘common EU’ interest however of course – see below). This is
especially important at times of high politicization. Member states ofﬁcials
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express similar opinions. One German ofﬁcial, for example, contended that,
from the perspective of Central Asians, the EU is seen to be far away and a
more neutral actor than others.37 Action through the EU can also neutralize
potentially negative perceptions amongst third-party actors of single Euro-
pean states based on historical factors or previous disputes.38 Another ofﬁcial
from an EU member state suggested that the EU banner is useful when a
member state wants to deliver a difﬁcult message in a Central Asian
country as third parties were less likely to get upset if the message emanates
from the EU.39 Under these circumstances, the EU provides forms of ‘insti-
tutional camouﬂage’ (Wood 2009: 613), where raising problems under the
EU banner avoids singling out companies or member states that may other-
wise face repercussions.40 Indeed, energy companies stress that the EU
should seek to retain this neutral image, acting as a mediator, maintaining
positive relations with producer states and refraining from actions that
might cause political/commercial tensions (Royal Dutch Shell 2011: 6).
The EU’s ability to perform this role thus depends on the broader political
relationship. In addition to questions concerning legal and governance
regimes, companies most commonly lobby the EU to maintain positive politi-
cal relations with third-party countries.41 Demonstrating, the instrumental
pragmatism described previously, member states also avoid using the EU
when political relations between the EU institutions and a host country are
not good. For example, one ofﬁcial noted how the EU approach is not as effec-
tive in Belarus, for example, where the EU institutions are viewed negatively
owing to EU-level sanctions.42 The same is sometimes the case in Uzbekistan,
where the EU applied sanctions in 2006.43 In these markets, trying to resolve
disputes via the EU can cause problems. As such, member states are less likely
to use EU-led approaches.
This ‘neutral’ appearance is particularly useful for companies when both a
company and home government are involved in (different) disputes with a
producer government. Under such circumstances a company may wish to
minimize their association with their government so that the wider dispute
does not hinder the resolution of the company’s particular issue.44 An
energy expert interviewed noted how UK ofﬁcials have at times been
unable to help British energy companies in Russia because of difﬁcult
Russia–UK bilateral relations.45 Under such circumstances, the EU presents a
more viable source of political support.46
The limits of EU commercial diplomacy?
Does this therefore signal the beginning of the end for member state com-
mercial energy diplomacy? Several factors suggest not. Firstly, given the
need to avoid ‘picking winners’ amongst companies (or member states), Euro-
pean ofﬁcials self-impose limitations on EU commercial diplomacy. While
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companies are concerned with gaining representation for themselves (and
often a privileged position vis-à-vis other companies),47 ofﬁcials stress that it
is not the job of the Commission/EEAS to intervene on behalf of particular
companies but rather, as described above, the EU should engage when
norms/rules that affect the general interest of the industry are infringed.48 It
is clear that ofﬁcials do not want be seen as on the ‘side’ of the companies
(either back home or vis-à-vis the host state). Of course, sometimes a speciﬁc
dispute (corruption attempts, tax issues, government pressure, etc.) infringes a
wider rule/norm, and under those circumstances it would be, in their opinion,
the EU’s responsibility to react.49 EU action would of course therefore beneﬁt a
speciﬁc company in that particular instance, but this would be a secondary
consequence of EU action, rather than a direct motivation.50
Second, it is important to note that member states have shown signs of
limiting the EU’s role as well. While the commercial diplomacy discussed
above helps deal with the new pressures in Kazakhstan, it does not entail a
full shift of commercial diplomacy competence to the EU. Reﬂecting this
instrumental rationality discussed above, the UK government argued in
2006 that EU representation in the Caspian should be at the ‘right level’
with the ‘right competencies’ ‘to add value to the relationship between the
EU and the region’s governments’ (2006b: 4; emphasis added). Indeed,
member states have sought more EU ‘protective’ commercial diplomacy,
but have not pushed for more EU involvement in investment promotion,
which remains largely a member state competence. EU ofﬁcials do engage
in some investment promotion, organizing fairs and workshops, for
example, where commercial partners meet and come together.51 However,
they are obliged to offer and advertize these opportunities widely (usually
via energy business associations) rather than to speciﬁc companies.52
Member states by contrast retain the right to push individual deals and facili-
tate commercial arrangements for targeted national businesses.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the EU institutions’ ability to support
companies rests in part on their perceived ‘neutrality’. If the EU were seen
to be directly reﬂecting the interests of companies, this source of inﬂuence
would be diminished. This limit of stressing the general public European inter-
est, rather than private or national interests, makes the EU a more neutral
arbiter and better able to defend governance rules. EU ofﬁcials suggest that
being able to appeal to global rules in energy investment has considerable
traction in some contexts, such as Kazakhstan, where the government is
keen to present itself as an internationally engaged economy (and thus con-
cerned with reputational damage). However, remaining neutral places restric-
tions on support for companies (especially in terms of investment promotion).
Member states face fewer restrictions. Consequently, while the EU plays an
increasingly more active role in commercial energy diplomacy (especially in
investment protection), the EU is likely to remain a useful additional source
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of diplomatic support for companies, rather than a replacement for member
states.
Conclusion
In the face of a more challenging (and increasingly ‘non-coincident’) structural
environment in foreign energy markets from the mid-2000s onwards, the EU
has adopted a more signiﬁcant role in commercial energy diplomacy in the
Caspian. While member states are generally hesitant to delegate to the EU
in strategic areas, the increasing politicization of energy markets has made
it difﬁcult for member states to support companies and created functional
demand for EU-level commercial diplomacy. Taken together, the observations
set out above present a number of important implications for the literature on
EU foreign economic and energy policy.
First, by examining the behaviour of European actors in the Caspian, this
article has documented a clear area of EU diplomatic co-operation in
energy – challenging, at least in one area, the conventional view of a discor-
dant EU external energy policy. The increased efﬁciencies offered by EU co-
ordination, the greater inﬂuence of combined EU representation and the
more ‘neutral’ position of the EU institutions means that EU commercial diplo-
macy provides advantages for member states and companies, especially in
politicized markets. Findings here are of course speciﬁc to the Caspian/
Kazakhstan, but the examples from Russia/Argentina suggest a broader appli-
cability and scope for further research. Given the general view of energy as an
area characterized by a lack of diplomatic co-operation, this is a signiﬁcant
observation.
Second, this article contributes to debates about the nature of EU energy
policy. The EU has largely been seen as a market-promoting actor in
energy, with the core driver of EU policy being the promotion of governance
contra the more ‘geo-political’ diplomatic approaches of member states. This
article broadly supports the ‘market-power Europe’ view of EU in terms of
energy. However, it does so by showing how EU commercial energy diplo-
macy and EU energy governance need not be contrasting approaches, but
rather different means of achieving the same foreign policy goal: a more
secure external environment for energy businesses, primary agents of Euro-
pean energy supply and diversiﬁcation. Indeed, as described above, govern-
ance frameworks are not necessarily established in opposition to
diplomacy, but rather are a precondition for effective (commercial) diplomatic
action.
Finally, beyond the implications for energy policy studies, the article has
begun analysis of the commercial diplomatic practices of both member
states and EU institutions. This is signiﬁcant, as EU commercial diplomacy
has generally received little academic attention. The data above show that
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member states are prepared to co-operate diplomatically in sensitive com-
mercial areas, but that they are also strategically selective. While member
states have delegated an important commercial diplomatic role to the EU
in investment protection, they have been more hesitant to cede ground
on investment promotion (where acting nationally is still advantageous).
For their part, the EU institutions are limited in terms of investment pro-
motion, both by a desire not to be seen to be ‘picking winners’ and
need to remain ‘neutral’ (which companies and member states actively
demand it does). Furthermore, member states demonstrate pragmatism
in their uploading of commercial issues/disputes to the EU level. When
the EU doesn’t offer beneﬁts of ‘neutrality’ (in Belarus or Uzbekistan, for
example), member states are less inclined to use the EU for commercial
matters.
Given the observations above and the growing role for FDI in the global
economy, these ﬁndings present a strong basis for further research into EU
commercial diplomacy, both in other energy-rich areas (such as the Middle
East, Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa) and in different commercial
sectors outside of energy. Indeed, as the world becomes more ‘multi-polar’
and as EU-preferred trade and investment norms are increasingly challenged
globally, the EU is likely to emerge as an important source of commercial dip-
lomatic protection for EU member states and EU foreign-investing compa-
nies – albeit as a source of support to, rather than a replacement for,
member states’ own commercial diplomatic activity.
Notes
1. Given the political/economic sensitivities surrounding energy policy, all intervie-
wees requested that data be used in a non-attributable way and as such no iden-
tifying information regarding interviewees is given in this article. A few
interviewees requested complete anonymity. In these cases their institutional
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3. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial[a], 20 July 2015.
4. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial, 27 July 2011.
5. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial, 9 March 2015.
6. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial, 17 February 2015.
7. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial[a], 20 July 2015.
8. Ibid.
9. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial[b], 20 July 2015.
10. Statoil is of course not an ‘EU’ company but one that nonetheless has an impor-
tant supply and business relationship with EU ﬁrms and states.
11. Interview, UK government Ofﬁcial, 20 August 2012.
12. Interview, EU member state ofﬁcial 20 August 2012.
13. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial 16 August 2012.
14. Interview, EU member state ofﬁcial 20 August 2012.
15. Interview, EU Commission ofﬁcial 16 August 2012.
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